Dynamic Regulation of Public Good Quality
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More about this item
KeywordsQuality; Regulation; Asymmetric Information;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2006-05-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2006-05-13 (Regulation)
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