Dynamic Incentive Contracts with Uncorrelated Private Information and History Dependent Outcomes
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Other versions of this item:
- GERARD Gaudet & PIERRE Lasserres & NGO VAN Long, 1996. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts With Uncorrelated Private Information And History-Dependent Outcomes," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 321-334, December.
- Gérard Gaudet & Pierre Lasserre & Ngo Van Long, 1995. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts with Uncorrelated Private Information and History Dependent Outcomes," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-37, CIRANO.
References listed on IDEAS
- Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447 Elsevier.
- Gaudet, G. & Lasserre, P. & Long, N.V., 1995.
"Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints,"
9515, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
- Gérard Gaudet & Pierre Lasserre & Ngo Van Long, 1995. "Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-33, CIRANO.
- GAUDET, Gerard & LASSERRE, Pierre & LONG, Ngo Van, 1995. "Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints," Cahiers de recherche 9515, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
- Gaudet, Gerard & Lassere, Pierre & Long, Ngo Van, 1995. "Optimal Resource Royalties with Unknown and Temporally Independent Extraction Cost Structures," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(3), pages 715-749, August.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dennis L. Gärtner, 2010. "Monopolistic screening under learning by doing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 574-597.
- Stéphane Auray & Thomas Mariotti & Fabien Moizeau, 2006. "Dynamic Regulation of Public Good Quality," Cahiers de recherche 0610, CIRPEE.
- Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998.
"Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
- Hassan Benchekroun & Ngo Van Long, 1997. "Efficiency Inducing Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-21, CIRANO.
- Stéphane Auray & Thomas Mariotti & Fabien Moizeau, 2011.
"Dynamic regulation of quality,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 42(2), pages 246-265, June.
- Auray, Stéphane & Mariotti, Thomas & Moizeau, Fabien, 2007. "Dynamic Regulation of Quality," IDEI Working Papers 397, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Stéphane Auray & Thomas Mariotti & Fabien Moizeau, 2011. "Dynamic regulation of quality," Post-Print halshs-00607190, HAL.
- Stéphane Auray & Thomas Mariotti & Fabien Moizeau, 2008. "Dynamic Regulation of Quality," Cahiers de recherche 08-11, Departement d'Economique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
- Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
More about this item
KeywordsContrats incitatifs; Dynamique; Information asymétrique; Relation principal-agent; Investissement; Learning by doing. Incentive contracts; Dynamic; Asymmetric information; Principal-agent relationship; Investment; Learning by doing.;
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