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The management of natural resources under asymmetry of information

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  • Gérard Gaudet
  • Pierre Lasserre

Abstract

We provide an introductory review to the application of the theory of incentives under asymmetry of information to the exploitation and management of natural resources. We concentrate mostly on principalagent problems with adverse selection as posed by the regulation of nonrenewable resources, stressing the fact that the inherently dynamic nature of natural resource exploitation creates situations and results not found in other contexts. We also point out private information issues that may arise involving renewable as opposed to nonrenewable resources, strategic interactions with signalling between decision makers in resource exploitation games, and the design of environmental policy where principal-agent problems subject to moral hazard may occur

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Gaudet & Pierre Lasserre, 2015. "The management of natural resources under asymmetry of information," CIRANO Working Papers 2015s-17, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2015s-17
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2015s-17.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Julien Daubanes & Pierre Lasserre, 2014. "Dispatching after Producing: The Supply of Non-Renewable Resources," CESifo Working Paper Series 5060, CESifo.
    2. Julien Daubanes & Pierre Lasserre, 2014. "Dispatching after Producing: The Supply of Non-Renewable Resources," CESifo Working Paper Series 5060, CESifo.
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    Cited by:

    1. Julie Ing, 2016. "Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 16/263, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    2. Ing, Julie, 2020. "Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    3. Lappi, Pauli, 2020. "On optimal extraction under asymmetric information over reclamation costs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural resources; asymmetric information; incentive mechanisms; adverse selection; regulation; Natural resources; asymmetric information; incentive mechanisms; adverse selection; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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