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Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks

Author

Listed:
  • David Martimort

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jérôme Pouyet

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ESSEC Business School)

  • Francesco Ricci

    (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier, UM - Université de Montpellier, UMR ART-Dev - Acteurs, Ressources et Territoires dans le Développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We characterize the optimal contract for resource extraction in a context where the concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. The dynamics of extraction is characterized by a virtual Hotelling rule in which costs of extraction are replaced with virtual costs of extraction. We analyze how structural breaks in the price of resource impact the dynamics of extraction.

Suggested Citation

  • David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018. "Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks," Post-Print hal-02057380, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02057380
    DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.132.0081
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02057380
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    as
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    2. Lionel Thomas & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Manh Nguyen Hung, 2006. "Optimal resource extraction contract with adverse selection," Post-Print hal-00448793, HAL.
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    4. David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018. "Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(2), pages 311-347, June.
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    1. David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018. "Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(2), pages 311-347, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Non-Renewable Resource Management; Delegated Management; Optimal Contract; Asymmetric Information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q31 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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