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Concession minière et asymétrie d'information

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  • Jean-Christophe Poudou
  • Lionel Thomas

Abstract

[eng] Mining Concessions and Asymmetric Information by Jean-Christophe Poudou and Lionel Thomas . We study a concession contract for exploiting an exhaustible resource when a mining firm has private information about its costs. We show that the "traditional" balance between revenue and efficiency, which results in a lower level of production than with symmetric information, is not systematic in this contract. This is due to the specific depletion cost of non-renewable resources. [fre] Nous analysons le contrat de concession concernant l'exploitation d'une ressource non renouvelable lorsque l'opérateur minier détient une information privée sur ses coûts. Nous montrons que l'arbitrage " traditionnel " rente-efficacité consistant à diminuer la production par rapport au cadre informationnel symétrique n'est pas systématique dans le contrat de concession minière. Nous démontrons que ce résultat est dû à la présence de l'effet de stock caractérisant les ressources non renouvelables.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Christophe Poudou & Lionel Thomas, 2000. "Concession minière et asymétrie d'information," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 129-138.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_143_2_6096
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2000.6096
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6096
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    1. Petter Osmundsen, 1998. "Dynamic Taxation of Non-renewable Natural Resources Under Asymmetric Information About Reserves," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 933-951, November.
    2. Karp, Larry & Livernois, John, 1992. "On efficiency-inducing taxation for a non-renewable resource monopolist," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 219-239, November.
    3. Gaudet, Gerard & Lassere, Pierre & Long, Ngo Van, 1995. "Optimal Resource Royalties with Unknown and Temporally Independent Extraction Cost Structures," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(3), pages 715-749, August.
    4. David Levhari & Nissan Liviatan, 1977. "Notes on Hotelling's Economics of Exhaustible Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 10(2), pages 177-192, May.
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    1. Hung, Nguyen Manh & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Thomas, Lionel, 2006. "Optimal resource extraction contract with adverse selection," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 78-85, June.
    2. David Martimort & Jerome Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018. "Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 132, pages 81-103.
    3. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Sebastien Roussel, 2014. "Payments for Carbon Sequestration in Agricultural Soils: Incentives for the Future and Rewards for the Past," CEEES Paper Series CE3S-01/14, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics.
    4. Hung, N.-M & Poudou, J.-C. & Thomas, L., 2003. "Mining and Incentive Concession Contracts," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 03.10.38, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.

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