Concession minière et asymétrie d'information
[eng] Mining Concessions and Asymmetric Information by Jean-Christophe Poudou and Lionel Thomas We study a concession contract for exploiting an exhaustible resource when a mining firm has private information about its costs. We show that the "traditional" balance between revenue and efficiency, which results in a lower level of production than with symmetric information, is not systematic in this contract. This is due to the specific depletion cost of non-renewable resources. [fre] Nous analysons le contrat de concession concernant l'exploitation d'une ressource non renouvelable lorsque l'opérateur minier détient une information privée sur ses coûts. Nous montrons que l'arbitrage " traditionnel " rente-efficacité consistant à diminuer la production par rapport au cadre informationnel symétrique n'est pas systématique dans le contrat de concession minière. Nous démontrons que ce résultat est dû à la présence de l'effet de stock caractérisant les ressources non renouvelables.
Volume (Year): 143 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- Petter Osmundsen, 1998. "Dynamic Taxation of Non-renewable Natural Resources Under Asymmetric Information About Reserves," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 933-951, November.
- David Levhari & Nissan Liviatan, 1977. "Notes on Hotelling's Economics of Exhaustible Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 10(2), pages 177-192, May.
- Karp, Larry & Livernois, John, 1992. "On efficiency-inducing taxation for a non-renewable resource monopolist," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 219-239, November.
- Gaudet, Gerard & Lassere, Pierre & Long, Ngo Van, 1995. "Optimal Resource Royalties with Unknown and Temporally Independent Extraction Cost Structures," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(3), pages 715-749, August.
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