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On the Dynamics of the Regulation of Pollution: Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Persistent Pollutant

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  • Benford, Frank A.

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  • Benford, Frank A., 1998. "On the Dynamics of the Regulation of Pollution: Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Persistent Pollutant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:36:y:1998:i:1:p:1-25
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    6. Sappington, David E M & Sibley, David S, 1988. "Regulating without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus Subsidy Scheme," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(2), pages 297-306, May.
    7. Falk Ita & Mendelsohn Robert, 1993. "The Economics of Controlling Stock Pollutants: An Efficient Strategy for Greenhouse Gases," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 76-88, July.
    8. Baron, David P., 1985. "Regulation of prices and pollution under incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 211-231, November.
    9. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
    10. Bulckaen, Fabrizio, 1997. "Emissions Charge and Asymmetric Information: Consistently a Problem?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 100-106, September.
    11. Olli Tahvonen, 1995. "Dynamics of pollution control when damage is sensitive to the rate of pollution accumulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 9-27, January.
    12. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    13. Beavis, Brian & Dobbs, Ian M., 1986. "The dynamics of optimal environmental regulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 415-423, September.
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    16. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1980. "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(5), pages 857-860.
    17. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
    18. Griffin, Ronald C., 1987. "Environmental policy for spatial and persistent pollutants," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 41-53, March.
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    20. David Sappington, 1980. "Strategic Firm Behavior under a Dynamic Regulatory Adjustment Process," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 360-372, Spring.
    21. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
    22. Sappington, David E M & Sibley, David S, 1990. "Regulating without Cost Information: Further Observations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(4), pages 1027-1029, November.
    23. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
    24. Segerson, Kathleen, 1988. "Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
    25. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 22-39, July.
    26. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-1186, December.
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    28. Gaudet, Gerard & Lassere, Pierre & Long, Ngo Van, 1995. "Optimal Resource Royalties with Unknown and Temporally Independent Extraction Cost Structures," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(3), pages 715-749, August.
    29. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shuichi Ohori, 2007. "Dynamic environmental taxes in an international duopoly," KIER Working Papers 628, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Farmer, Amy & Kahn, James R. & McDonald, Judith A. & O'Neill, Robert, 2001. "Rethinking the optimal level of environmental quality: justifications for strict environmental policy," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 461-473, March.
    3. Cyril Monnet & Ted Temzelides, 2016. "Monetary emissions trading mechanisms," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 85-100, March.
    4. Kritikos, Alexander S., 2004. "A penalty system to enforce policy measures under incomplete information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 385-403, September.
    5. Tsur, Yacov & Zemel, Amos, 2002. "The Regulation of Environmental Innovations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 242-260, September.
    6. Martín-Herrán, Guiomar & Rubio, Santiago J., 2016. "The Strategic Use of Abatement by a Polluting Monopoly," ET: Economic Theory 244532, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    7. Carmen Arguedas & Francisco Cabo & Guiomar Martín-Herrán, 2017. "Optimal Pollution Standards and Non-compliance in a Dynamic Framework," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(3), pages 537-567, November.
    8. Tarui, Nori & Polasky, Stephen, 2005. "Environmental regulation with technology adoption, learning and strategic behavior," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 447-467, November.
    9. Tarui, Nori & Polasky, Stephen, 2003. "Environmental Regulation With Innovation And Learning: Rules Versus Discretion," 2003 Annual meeting, July 27-30, Montreal, Canada 21911, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    10. Newell, Richard G. & Pizer, William A., 2003. "Regulating stock externalities under uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 416-432, March.
    11. Francisco Candel-Sánchez, 2012. "Pigouvian taxes and the Varian’s mechanism in dynamic settings," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 39-51, August.
    12. List, John A. & Mason, Charles F., 2001. "Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 277-296, November.
    13. Candel-Sanchez, Francisco, 2006. "The externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 517-526, July.
    14. Tarui, Nori, 2002. "Intertemporal Permit Trading For Stock Pollutants With Uncertainty," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19752, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    15. Candel-Sanchez, Francisco, 2006. "Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 56-59, January.
    16. Moledina, Amyaz A. & Coggins, Jay S. & Polasky, Stephen & Costello, Christopher, 2003. "Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: prices versus quantities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 356-376, March.
    17. repec:gam:jeners:v:10:y:2017:i:8:p:1201-:d:108174 is not listed on IDEAS

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