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Pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions

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  • Armin Schmutzler

Abstract

In this paper, a model of environmental regulation with imperfect monitoring of emissions is presented. The regulator can use linear output taxes and emission taxes to influence the pollution level of a risk-averse firm. In contrast to the perfect monitoring case, a tax mix will usually be optimal. The relative weight depends on the degree of risk aversion and monitoring imperfection, and on technological factors. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Suggested Citation

  • Armin Schmutzler, 1996. "Pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(3), pages 251-262, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:251-262 DOI: 10.1007/BF00782148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gerhard Clemenz, 1999. "Adverse Selection and Pigou Taxes," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 13(1), pages 13-29, January.
    2. Karine Nyborg, 2000. "Voluntary Agreements and Non-Verifiable Emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 17(2), pages 125-144, October.
    3. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2011. "The Economics of Non-Point-Source Pollution," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 355-373, October.
    4. Aftab, Ashar & Hanley, Nick & Baiocchi, Giovanni, 2010. "Integrated regulation of nonpoint pollution: Combining managerial controls and economic instruments under multiple environmental targets," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 24-33, November.
    5. Schmutzler, Armin & Goulder, Lawrence H., 1997. "The Choice between Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 51-64, January.
    6. Muller-Furstenberger, G. & Stephan, G., 1997. "Environmental policy and cooperation beyond the nation state: an introduction and overview," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 99-114, March.
    7. Stefan Baumgärtner & Frank Jöst, 2000. "Joint Production, Externalities, and the Regulation of Production Networks," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 16(2), pages 229-251, June.

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