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Tradeable Permits, Missing Markets, and Technology

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  • Devlin, R.A.
  • Grafton, R.Q.

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of missing markets, heterogeneous pollutants, and the pollution technology of firms on the efficacy of transferable pollution permits. Under the assumption of perfect competition in all markets, we show that if firms can substitute among pollutants, then setting the “optimal” number of permits for only one pollutant will not, in general, lead to an efficient outcome. The degree of the inefficiency will depend on the information set available to the regulator and the substitutability among pollutants by firms. When establishing transferable pollution rights regulators should, therefore, consider the technology of firms. If firms discharge pollutants in the same fixed proportions, then the regulator need only set a market for one of the pollutants to ensure an efficient outcome. Where firms can substitute among pollutants, however, establishing a market for only one pollutant provides an incentive for firms to substitute to unregulated ones. This is an important policy issue as substitutability among pollutants within and across production processes may dampen the dynamic advantages of a tradeable permit policy. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Devlin, R.A. & Grafton, R.Q., 1993. "Tradeable Permits, Missing Markets, and Technology," Working Papers 9301e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ott:wpaper:9301e
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Grafton, Quentin R. & Devlin, Rose Anne, 1994. "Les permis d’émission et les charges : efficacité et substituabilité," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 70(2), pages 159-176, juin.
    2. Armin Schmutzler, 1996. "Pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(3), pages 251-262, April.
    3. Grischa Perino, 2008. "The merits of new pollutants and how to get them when patents are granted," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(3), pages 313-327, July.
    4. Christoph Lieb, 2004. "The Environmental Kuznets Curve and Flow versus Stock Pollution: The Neglect of Future Damages," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(4), pages 483-506, December.
    5. Don Fullerton & Inkee Hong & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 2001. "A Tax on Output of the Polluting Industry Is Not a Tax on Pollution: The Importance of Hitting the Target," NBER Chapters,in: Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy, pages 13-44 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Piotr Nowak & Maciej Romaniuk, 2009. "Applying fuzzy parametersin pricing financial derivatives inspiredby the kyoto protocol," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 4, pages 77-91.
    7. Stefan Baumgärtner & Frank Jöst, 2000. "Joint Production, Externalities, and the Regulation of Production Networks," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 16(2), pages 229-251, June.
    8. Simon Niemeyer, 1998. "Consumer-based carbon reduction incentives," Working Papers in Ecological Economics 9805, Australian National University, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, Ecological Economics Program.
    9. Piotr Nowak & Maciej Romaniuk, 2009. "Applying fuzzy parameters in pricing financial derivatives inspired by Kyoto Protocol," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Technology, Institute of Organization and Management, vol. 4, pages 77-91.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    pollution ; technology;

    JEL classification:

    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)

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