IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks

Listed author(s):
  • Joskow, P.L.

Modern theoretical principles to govern the design of incentive regulation mechanisms are reviewed and discussed. General issues associated with applying these principles in practice are identified. Examples of the actual application of incentive r egulation mechanisms to the regulation of prices and service quality for “unbundled” transmission and distribution networks are presented and discussed. Evidence regarding the performance of incentive regulation in practice for electric distribution and transmission networks is reviewed. Issues for future research are identified.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0511.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0607.

as
in new window

Length: 94
Date of creation: Feb 2006
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0607
Note: IO
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window

  1. Joskow, P.L., 2004. "Transmission Policy in the United States," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0454, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  2. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-937, October.
  4. Gasmi, F. & Laffont, J. J. & Sharkey, W. W., 2000. "Competition, universal service and telecommunications policy in developing countries," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 221-248, September.
  5. P. Joskow, 1974. "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation," Working papers 128, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Schmalensee, Richard, 1989. "An Expository Note on Depreciation and Profitability under Rate-of-Return Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 293-298, September.
  7. Sappington, David E M & Sibley, David S, 1990. "Regulating without Cost Information: Further Observations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(4), pages 1027-1029, November.
  8. Gagnepain, P. & Ivaldi, M., 1999. "Incentive Regulatory Policies: the Case of Public Transit Systems in France," Papers 99.515, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  9. Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. M.E. Beesley & S.C. Littlechild, 1989. "The Regulation of Privatized Monopolies in the United Kingdom," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 454-472, Autumn.
  11. Carrington, Roger & Coelli, Tim & Groom, Eric, 2002. "International Benchmarking for Monopoly Price Regulation: The Case of Australian Gas Distribution," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 191-216, March.
  12. Estache, Antonio & Guasch, Jose-Luis & Trujillo, Lourdes, 2003. "Price caps, efficiency payoffs, and infrastructure contract renegotiation in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3129, The World Bank.
  13. Paul L. Joskow, 2006. "Incentive Regulation for Electricity Networks," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(2), pages 3-9, 07.
  14. Ai, Chunrong & Sappington, David E M, 2002. "The Impact of State Incentive Regulation on the U.S. Telecommunications Industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 133-159, September.
  15. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean., 1988. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Working Papers 665, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  16. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
  17. Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1985. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Working papers 368, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  18. Paul L. Joskow, 1973. "Pricing Decisions of Regulated Firms: A Behavioral Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(1), pages 118-140, Spring.
  19. Lyon, Thomas P, 1996. "A Model of Sliding-Scale Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 227-247, May.
  20. Kridel, Donald J & Sappington, David E M & Weisman, Dennis L, 1996. "The Effects of Incentive Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry: A Survey," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 269-306, May.
  21. Pollitt, Michael, 2008. "Electricity reform in Argentina: Lessons for developing countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1536-1567, July.
  22. Jamasb, T. & Pollitt, M., 2007. "Incentive Regulation of Electricity Distribution Networks: Lessons of Experience from Britain," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0709, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  23. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, September.
  24. David Sappington, 1980. "Strategic Firm Behavior under a Dynamic Regulatory Adjustment Process," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 360-372, Spring.
  25. Brennan, Timothy J, 1989. "Regulating by Capping Prices," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 133-147, June.
  26. Chunrong AI & Salvador Martinez & David Sappington, 2004. "Incentive Regulation and Telecommunications Service Quality," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 263-285, 08.
  27. Isaac, R Mark, 1991. "Price Cap Regulation: A Case Study of Some Pitfalls of Implementation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 193-210, June.
  28. Geoff Bertram & Dan Twaddle, 2005. "Price-Cost Margins and Profit Rates in New Zealand Electricity Distribution Networks Since 1994: the Cost of Light Handed Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 281-308, 01.
  29. Jamasb, T. & Pollitt, M., 2000. "Benchmarking and regulation: international electricity experience," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 107-130, September.
  30. Joskow, P.L., 1989. "Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform And Structural Change In The Electric Power Industry," Working papers 516, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  31. Bernstein, Jeffrey I & Sappington, David E M, 1999. "Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 5-25, July.
  32. Mark Armstrong & David E. M. Sappington, 2004. "Toward a Synthesis of Models of Regulatory Policy Design with Limited Information," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 5-21, 07.
  33. Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington, 1989. "Regulatory Options and Price-Cap Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 405-416, Autumn.
  34. Giannakis, Dimitrios & Jamasb, Tooraj & Pollitt, Michael, 2005. "Benchmarking and incentive regulation of quality of service: an application to the UK electricity distribution networks," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(17), pages 2256-2271, November.
  35. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1984. "Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 447-470, Winter.
  36. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1987. "Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 413-436.
  37. Antonio Estache & Martin Rossi & Christian Ruzzier, 2004. "The Case for International Coordination of Electricity Regulation: Evidence from the Measurement of Efficiency in South America," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/43975, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  38. Newbery, David M & Pollitt, Michael G, 1997. "The Restructuring and Privatization of Britain's CEGB--Was It Worth It?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 269-303, September.
  39. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn.
  40. Domah, P. & Pollitt, M.G., 2000. "The Restructuring and Privatisation of Electricity Distribution and Supply Businesses in England and Wales: A Social Cost Benefit Analysis," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0007, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  41. Jamasb, Tooraj & Pollitt, Michael, 2003. "International benchmarking and regulation: an application to European electricity distribution utilities," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(15), pages 1609-1622, December.
  42. Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447 Elsevier.
  43. Jamasb, Tooraj & Nillesen, Paul & Pollitt, Michael, 2004. "Strategic behaviour under regulatory benchmarking," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 825-843, September.
  44. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
  45. Sappington, David E M & Sibley, David S, 1988. "Regulating without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus Subsidy Scheme," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(2), pages 297-306, May.
  46. Sappington David E. M., 2003. "The Effects of Incentive Regulation on Retail Telephone Service Quality in the United States," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(4), pages 1-21, December.
  47. Hogan, William W. & Walton, Steven L., 1994. "A study of the privatisation of the electricity supply industry in England and Wales," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 6(10), pages 73-73, December.
  48. Estache, Antonio & Rodriguez-Pardina, Martin, 1999. "Light and lightning at the end of the public tunnel : reform of the electricity sector in the Southern Cone," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2074, The World Bank.
  49. Cabral, Luis M B & Riordan, Michael H, 1989. "Incentives for Cost Reduction under Price Cap Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 93-102, June.
  50. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, September.
  51. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Working papers 397, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  52. Jarrell, Gregg A, 1978. "The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 269-295, October.
  53. Yossef Spiegel & Daniel F. Spulber, 1991. "The Capital Structure of Regulated Firms," Discussion Papers 942, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  54. Giannakis, D. & T. Jamasb & Pollitt, M.G., 2004. "Benchmarking and incentive regulation of quality of service: an application to the UK electricity distribution utilities," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0408, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0607. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jake Dyer)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.