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Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Price-Cap Regulation

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  • David Sibley

Abstract

A regulatory incentive mechanism is presented in which the regulated firm has superior information about both cost and demand, compared to the regulator. The mechanism leads to truthful revelation of the demand function and extracts all rents due to private demand information in a nondistorting way. The scheme assumes that the regulator can observe lagged expenditures by the firm. This mechanism leads to efficient pricing, operating, and investment behavior by the firm. Finally, it is shown that the mechanism is closely related to recent proposals for price-cap regulation and that under certain assumptions simple modifications of these proposals will lead to the mechanisms discussed herein.

Suggested Citation

  • David Sibley, 1989. "Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Price-Cap Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 392-404, Autumn.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:20:y:1989:i:autumn:p:392-404
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    Cited by:

    1. Dagobert Brito & Juan Rosellón, 2011. "Lumpy Investment in Regulated Natural Gas Pipelines: An Application of the Theory of the Second Best," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 533-553, September.
    2. Willington, Manuel & Li Ning, Jorge, 2014. "Regulating a monopoly with universal service obligations: The role of flexible tariff schemes," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 32-48.
    3. Anne Neumann & Juan Rosellón & Hannes Weigt, 2015. "Removing Cross-Border Capacity Bottlenecks in the European Natural Gas Market—A Proposed Merchant-Regulatory Mechanism," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 149-181, March.
    4. Li Ning, Jorge, 2009. "Second-degree price discrimination and universal access under (weighted average) price cap regulation," MPRA Paper 31321, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Egerer, Jonas & Rosellón, Juan & Schill, Wolf-Peter, 2015. "Power System Transformation toward Renewables: An Evaluation of Regulatory Approaches for Network Expansion," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 105-128.
    6. Luigi Benfratello & Alberto Iozzi & Paola Valbonesi, 2009. "Technology and incentive regulation in the Italian motorways industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 201-221, April.
    7. Lantz, Björn, 2008. "Hybrid revenue caps and incentive regulation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 688-695, May.
    8. Lantz, Bjorn, 2007. "A non-Bayesian piecewise linear approximation adjustment process for incentive regulation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 95-101, March.
    9. Lantz, Björn, 2009. "The double marginalization problem of transfer pricing: Theory and experiment," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 196(2), pages 434-439, July.
    10. Powell, Kirsty & Szymanski, Stefan, 1997. "Regulation through comparative performance evaluation," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 293-301, December.
    11. Herrera, Luis Ángel & Rosellón, Juan, 2014. "On distributive effects of optimal regulation for power grid expansion," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 189-204.
    12. Ramirez, Jose Carlos & Rosellon, Juan, 2002. "Pricing natural gas distribution in Mexico," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 231-248, May.
    13. Kim, Jae-Cheol & Lee, Sang-Ho, 1995. "An optimal regulation in an intertemporal oligopoly market: The Generalized Incremental Surplus Subsidy (GISS) scheme," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 225-249, September.
    14. William P. Rogerson, 1993. "Inter-temporal Cost Allocation and Managerial Investment Incentives," Discussion Papers 1060, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    15. Majumdar, Sumit K., 2010. "Institutional changes, firm size and wages in the telecommunications sector," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 201-217, July.
    16. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.

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