Incentive Regulation and Telecommunications Service Quality
We examine the impact of incentive regulation—price regulation and earnings sharing regulation—on retail service quality in the U.S. telecommunications industry between 1991 and 2002. We find that incentive regulation is associated with significantly higher service quality on several dimensions (e.g., more rapid installation of new telephone service, fewer trouble reports, and increased customer satisfaction) but significantly lower quality on some dimensions (fewer installation commitments met and longer delays in resolving reported service problems) Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
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Volume (Year): 26 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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- Bernstein, Jeffrey I & Sappington, David E M, 1999.
"Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 5-25, July.
- Jeffrey I. Bernstein & David E. M. Sappington, 1998. "Setting the X Factor in Price Cap Regulation Plans," NBER Working Papers 6622, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.