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Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints

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  • Gérard Gaudet
  • Pierre Lasserre
  • Ngo Van Long

Abstract

We investigate investment behavior when there is asymmetry of information between owners (the principal) and managers (the agent). The model accepts the standard cost-of-adjustment model as a particular case and is directly compared with it. For all types, information asymmetry distorts the relationship between investment and the cost of capital, and the relationship between investment and the shadow value of capital. In particular, a regime of inaction appears over a certain cost range, in an observationnally different way than when fixed adjustment costs, or irreversibilities, cause a similar phenomenon. Uncertainty, in the form of an increase in the spread of agents' types, tends to reduce investment despite symmetric adjustment cost and perfect competition. The model clarifies the interpretation of Tobin's q under asymmetric information and explains some results of the mergers and acquisition literature. En présence d'asymétrie d'information entre propriétaires (le principal) et administrateurs (l'agent), la relation investissement coût du capital et la relation investissement valeur implicite du capital subissent une distorsion pour tous les types. Dans un modèle avec coût d'ajustement par ailleurs standard, il apparaît notamment un régime d'inaction pour une certaine gamme de coûts. Ce phénomène se présente sous une forme différente de ce qu'implique la présence de coûts fixes ou d'irréversibilités,0501s ressemble à ce qui survient lorsque le coût du capital est différent pour une hausse que pour une baisse du stock. L'incertitude, qui prend la forme d'un élargissement de la distribution des types, tend cependant à réduire l'investissement. Le modèle clarifie l'interprétation du q de Tobin sous asymétrie d'information et explique certains résultats de la littérature sur les fusions et acquisitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Gaudet & Pierre Lasserre & Ngo Van Long, 1995. "Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-33, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:95s-33
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. GERARD Gaudet & PIERRE Lasserres & NGO VAN Long, 1996. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts With Uncorrelated Private Information And History-Dependent Outcomes," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 321-334, December.
    2. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentive contracts; Dynamic/Asymmetric information; Principal agent relationship; Investment; Cost of adjustment; Uncertainty; Contrats incitatifs ; dynamique ; information asymétrique ; relation principal-agent ; investissement ; incertitude.;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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