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Real Investment Decisions Under Adjustment Costs and Asymmetric Information

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Gérard Gaudet

    ()

    (Economics Department, Université de Montréal)

  • Pierre Lasserre

    ()

    (Economics Department, UQAM)

  • Ngo Van Long

    ()

    (Economics Department, McGill University)

Abstract

We study the cost-of-adjustment model of investment when there is asymmetry of information between owners (the principal) and managers (the agent). Information asymmetry distorts the relationship between investment and the cost of capital for all agent types, and a regime of inaction appears over a certain cost range, in an observationnally different way than when fixed adjustment costs, or irreversibilities, cause a similar phenomenon. Uncertainty, in the form of an increase in the spread of agents' types, tends to reduce investment despite symmetric adjustment cost and perfect competition. The model gives a new interpretation of Tobin's q under asymmetric information, explaining some results of the mergers and acquisition literature.

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File URL: http://www.unites.uqam.ca/eco/cahiers/wp9909.pdf
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Paper provided by Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques in its series Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM with number 9908.

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Length: 38
Date of creation: Aug 1999
Publication status: published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control; 23(1), October 1998, pages 71-95.
Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:9909
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Keywords: Investment; information asymmetry; adjustment cost; mergers and acquisition;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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  1. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1989. "Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 69-84, March.
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  5. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
  6. Lang, Larry H P & Stulz, Rene M, 1994. "Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1248-1280, December.
  7. Robert S. Chirinko, 1992. "Business Fixed Investment Spending: A Critical survey of Modeling Strategies, Empirical Results, and Policy Implications," Working Papers 9213, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
  8. Diamond, Douglas W, 1989. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 828-862, August.
  9. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1991. " The Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 297-355, March.
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  11. Demers, Fanny S. & Demers, Michel & Schaller, Huntley, 1994. "Irreversible investment and costs of adjustment," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9416, CEPREMAP.
  12. Abel, Andrew B & Blanchard, Olivier J, 1986. "The Present Value of Profits and Cyclical Movements in Investment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 249-273, March.
  13. Caballero, Ricardo J, 1991. "On the Sign of the Investment-Uncertainty Relationship," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 279-288, March.
  14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
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  16. Abel, Andrew B, 1983. "Optimal Investment under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 228-233, March.
  17. Hayashi, Fumio, 1982. "Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A Neoclassical Interpretation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 213-224, January.
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Cited by:

  1. Shibata, Takashi, 2009. "Investment timing, asymmetric information, and audit structure: A real options framework," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 903-921, April.
  2. Shibata, Takashi & Nishihara, Michi, 2010. "Dynamic investment and capital structure under manager-shareholder conflict," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 158-178, February.
  3. Ngo Long, 2011. "Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 115-148, March.
  4. Lee, Tan, 2004. "Determinants of the foreign equity share of international joint ventures," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 2261-2275, October.
  5. Claessens, Stijn & Ueda, Kenichi & Yafeh, Yishay, 2010. "Financial Frictions, Investment, and Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers 8170, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Jou, Jyh-Bang, 2004. "Environment, irreversibility and optimal effluent standards," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 48(1), March.
  7. Claessens, Stijn & Ueda, Kenichi & Yafeh, Yishay, 2014. "Institutions and financial frictions: Estimating with structural restrictions on firm value and investment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 107-122.
  8. Yishay Yafeh & Kenichi Ueda & Stijn Claessens, 2010. "Investment and Institutions," 2010 Meeting Papers 513, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
  10. Jyh-Bang Jou, 2001. "Environment, Asset Characteristics, and Optimal Effluent Fees," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 20(1), pages 27-39, September.

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