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Profit Shifting And Trade Agreements In Imperfectly Competitive Markets

  • Kyle Bagwell
  • Robert W. Staiger

When markets are imperfectly competitive, trade policies can alter the terms of trade, shift profits from one country to another, and moderate or exacerbate existing distortions that are associated with the presence of monopoly power. In light of the various ways in which trade policies may influence welfare, it might be expected that new rationales for trade agreements would arise once imperfectly competitive markets are allowed. In this paper, we consider several trade models that feature imperfectly competitive markets and argue that the basic rationale for a trade agreement is, in fact, the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets. In all of the models that we consider, and whether or not governments have political-economic objectives, the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the inefficient terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume. Having identified the problem that a trade agreement might solve, we next evaluate the form that an efficiency-enhancing trade agreement might take. Here, too, our results parallel the results established previously for models with perfectly competitive markets. In particular, we show that the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination (MFN) are efficiency enhancing, as they serve to "undo" the terms-of-trade driven restrictions in trade volume that occur when governments pursue unilateral trade policies.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00712.x
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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 53 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 1067-1104

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Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:53:y:2012:i:4:p:1067-1104
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  1. Spencer, Barbara J & Brander, James A, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 707-22, October.
  2. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983. "Trade Warfare: Tariffs and Cartels," NBER Working Papers 1193, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1981. "Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 14(3), pages 371-89, August.
  4. Brander, James A., 1981. "Intra-industry trade in identical commodities," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, February.
  5. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999. "Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT," NBER Working Papers 7071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
  7. Brander, James A., 1995. "Strategic trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1395-1455 Elsevier.
  8. Krugman, Paul, 1980. "Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the Pattern of Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(5), pages 950-59, December.
  9. Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks," CEPR Discussion Papers 806, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition," Working Papers 517, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  11. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2009. "Delocation and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets," NBER Working Papers 15444, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
  13. Pol Antràs & Robert W. Staiger, 2008. "Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements," NBER Working Papers 14285, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "An Economic Theory of GATT," NBER Working Papers 6049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Baldwin, Richard, 1987. "Politically realistic objective functions and trade policy PROFs and tariffs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-290.
  16. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Venables, Anthony J., 1985. "Trade and trade policy with imperfect competition: The case of identical products and free entry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 1-19, August.
  18. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System," NBER Working Papers 5932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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