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Subsidios a la producción y delegación de la política comercial en una unión aduanera

  • José Méndez Naya

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    Partiendo de un modelo de dumping recíproco en el que existen tres países, se justifica que los acuerdos de comercio preferencial entre países pueden surgir como una respuesta estratégica a los subsidios a las exportaciones por parte de un tercer país. Al mismo tiempo, se estudian los efectos sobre el bienestar derivados de la delegación de la política comercial en el seno de una unión aduanera cuando uno de los países miembros dispone de un instrumento adicional de política como son los subsidios a la producción. En este contexto se justifica que la formación de una unión aduanera no es sostenible si no existe la posibilidad de transferencias de utilidad entre los países miembros.

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    File URL: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/uploads/publicacion/5cd2e2a8-a857-4a20-af7a-a74b4cc160bf.pdf
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    Article provided by University of Chile, Department of Economics in its journal Estudios de Economia.

    Volume (Year): 29 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 2 Year 2002 (December)
    Pages: 231-246

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    Handle: RePEc:udc:esteco:v:29:y:2002:i:2:p:231-246
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.uchile.cl/

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    1. David Collie, 1997. "Delegation and Strategic Trade Policy," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 35-46.
    2. Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1991. "Delegation Games in Customs Unions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 391-97, April.
    3. Brander, James A., 1981. "Intra-industry trade in identical commodities," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14, February.
    4. James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Raymond RIEZMAN, 2013. "Customs Unions and the Core," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 3, pages 33-43 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Martin Richardson, 1994. "Customs Unions and Domestic Taxes," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 537-50, August.
    8. Brian R. Copeland, 1990. "Strategic Interaction among Nations: Negotiable and Non-negotiable Trade Barriers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 84-108, February.
    9. Das, Satya P., 1997. "Strategic managerial delegation and trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 173-188, August.
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