Tariff Policy for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information
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- Dobrin R. Kolev & Thomas J. Prusa, 1997. "Tariff Policy for a Monopolist Under Incomplete Information," NBER Working Papers 6090, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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