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Majority voting leads to unanimity

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  • Geir Asheim

  • Carl Claussen

  • Tore Nilssen

Abstract

We consider a situation where society decides, through majority voting in a secret ballot, between the alternatives of ‘reform’ and ‘status quo’. Reform is assumed to create a minority of winners, while being efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense. We explore the consequences of allowing binding transfers between voters conditional on the chosen alternative. In particular, we establish conditions under which the winners wish to compensate all losers, thus leading to unanimity for reform, rather than compensating some losers to form a non-maximal majority. The analysis employs concepts from cooperative game theory.
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Suggested Citation

  • Geir Asheim & Carl Claussen & Tore Nilssen, 2006. "Majority voting leads to unanimity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 91-110, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2006:i:1:p:91-110
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0042-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Corinna Ahlfeld, 2010. "Reputation Sells -Compensation Payments in the Political Sphere," Departmental Discussion Papers 145, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    2. Jain, Sanjay & Majumdar, Sumon & Mukand, Sharun W, 2014. "Walk the line: Conflict, state capacity and the political dynamics of reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 150-166.
    3. C. A. Claussen, 2002. "On the Dynamic Consistency of Reform and Compensation Schemes," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(3), pages 133-144.
    4. Sanjay Jain, 2017. "Worker retraining and transfer payments: The political economy of social protection," WIDER Working Paper Series 044, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Sanjay Jain, 2017. "Worker retraining and transfer payments: The political economy of social protection," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-44, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    6. Jain, Sanjay & Majumdar, Sumon, 2016. "State capacity, redistributive compensation and the political economy of economic policy reform," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 462-473.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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