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Vote Buying, Supermajorities, and Flooded Coalitions

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  • Groseclose, Tim
  • Snyder, James M.

Abstract

In a recent paper, Banks (2000), adopting the framework of our model (Groseclose and Snyder 1996), derives several new and noteworthy results. In addition, he provides a counterexample to our proposition 4. Here we explain the error in our proposition but note that we can correct it easily if we invoke an additional assumption: In equilibrium the winning vote buyer constructs a nonflooded coalition, that is, she does not bribe every member of her coalition. We conclude with a brief discussion of the substantive implications of Banks's proposition 1; we note that it provides additional support for our general claim that minimal winning coalitions should be rare in a vote-buying game.

Suggested Citation

  • Groseclose, Tim & Snyder, James M., 2000. "Vote Buying, Supermajorities, and Flooded Coalitions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(3), pages 683-684, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:03:p:683-684_22
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    Cited by:

    1. Boyer, Pierre C. & Konrad, Kai A. & Roberson, Brian, 2017. "Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 49-62.
    2. Geir Asheim & Carl Claussen & Tore Nilssen, 2006. "Majority voting leads to unanimity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 91-110, December.
    3. Bernard Grofman & Scott Feld, 2005. "Thinking About the Political Impacts of the Electoral College," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 1-18, April.
    4. Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 2007. "Succession Rules and Leadership Rents," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(4), pages 622-645, August.
    5. David P Baron, 2019. "Lobbying dynamics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 403-452, July.
    6. Agustín Casas & Martín Gonzalez-Eiras, 2021. "Cooperation and Retaliation in Legislative Bargaining," Working Papers 95, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    7. Christian Dippel, 2012. "Groseclose and Snyder in finite legislatures," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(2), pages 265-273, April.

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