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A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Bai, Chong-En
  • Li, David Daokui
  • Tao, Zhigang
  • Wang, Yijiang

Abstract

During transition, maintaining employment and providing a social safety net for the unemployed are important to social stability, which in turn is crucial for the productivity of the whole economy. Because independent institutions for social safety are lacking and firms with strong profit incentives have little incentive to promote social stability due to its public good nature, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are needed to continue their role in providing social welfare. Charged with the multi-tasks of efficient production as well as social welfare provision, SOEs continue to be given low profit incentives and consequently, their financial performance continues to be poor.

Suggested Citation

  • Bai, Chong-En & Li, David Daokui & Tao, Zhigang & Wang, Yijiang, 2001. "A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 2781, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2781
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Xiaobo & Kanbur, Ravi, 2005. "Spatial inequality in education and health care in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 189-204.
    2. Elliott Parker & Judith Thornton, 2007. "Fiscal Centralisation and Decentralisation in Russia and China," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 49(4), pages 514-542, December.
    3. Xu, Cheng-Gang, 2010. "The Institutional Foundations of China’s Reforms and Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 7654, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Zhang, Anming & Zhang, Yimin & Zhao, Ronald, 2002. "Profitability and productivity of Chinese industrial firms: Measurement and ownership implications," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 65-88.
    5. Chong-En Bai & David D. Li & Zhigang Tao & Yijiang Wang, 2001. "A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 367, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    6. Gary Jefferson, 2016. "State-Owned Enterprise in China: Reform, Performance, and Prospects," Working Papers 109R, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School, revised Mar 2017.
    7. Peng, Winnie Qian & Wei, K.C. John & Yang, Zhishu, 2011. "Tunneling or propping: Evidence from connected transactions in China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 306-325, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dual-Track Reform; Multi-Task; Social Stability; Unemployment;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • J23 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Demand
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
    • P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General
    • P23 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Factor and Product Markets; Industry Studies; Population
    • P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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