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The Political Economy of Transition

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  • Gerard Rpland

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  • Gerard Rpland, 2001. "The Political Economy of Transition," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 413, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2001-413
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    Cited by:

    1. Grosjean, Pauline & Senik, Claudia, 2007. "Should Market Liberalization precede Democracy ? Causal Relations between Political Preferences and Development," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) 0704, CEPREMAP.

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