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Eliminating Price Supports: A Political Economy Perspective

Author

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  • LEWIS, T.R.
  • WARE, R.
  • FEENSTRA, R.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Lewis, T.R. & Ware, R. & Feenstra, R., 1988. "Eliminating Price Supports: A Political Economy Perspective," Papers 319, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:caldav:319
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    Cited by:

    1. Bourguignon, Francois & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Is financial openness bad for education? A political economy perspective on development," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 891-903, May.
    2. Chambers, Robert G. & Lopez, Ramon, 1993. "Public investment and real-price supports," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 73-82, August.
    3. Chambers, Robert G., 1994. "National Agricultural Policies in a Free-Trade Area," Working Papers 197797, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    4. Feestra, R.C. & Lewis, T.R. & Mcmillan, J., 1989. "Designing Policies To Open Trade," Papers 349, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
    5. Robert C. Feenstra & Tracy R. Lewis, 1991. "Distributing The Gains From Trade With Incomplete Information," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 21-39, March.
    6. Brent Hueth, 2000. "The Goals of U.S. Agricultural Policy: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(1), pages 14-24.
    7. Turpin, Nadine & Bontems, Philippe & Rotillon, Gilles, 2004. "Lutte contre la pollution diffuse sur un bassin d’élevage : comparaison d’instruments de régulation en présence d’asymétrie d’information," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), INRA (French National Institute for Agricultural Research), vol. 72.
    8. Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 3-19, June.
    9. Happe, Kathrin & Balmann, Alfons & Kellermann, Konrad & Sahrbacher, Christoph, 2008. "Does structure matter? The impact of switching the agricultural policy regime on farm structures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 431-444, August.
    10. Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995. "Optimal Design Of A Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 20(02), December.
    11. Hueth, Brent, 1998. "Target Prices, Payment Limits And Non-Market Concerns In The Design Of U.S. Agricultural Policy," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 20992, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    12. Gerard Rpland, 2001. "The Political Economy of Transition," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 413, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    13. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1995. "Using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce resource rights under limited information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 431-455, July.
    14. Sheriff, Glenn, 2008. "Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 72-89, January.
    15. Doh Shin Jeon, "undated". "Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation," Economics Working Papers 623, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2006.

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