The Goals of U.S. Agricultural Policy: A Mechanism Design Approach
This article examines motivations underlying the government's choice of alternative policy mechanisms for subsidizing agriculture. Optimal policies are analyzed for three government objectives: one where the government wishes to ensure a minimum level of net income for all farmers, a second where the government's only concern is to transfer income from consumers and taxpayers to the farm sector, and a final “augmented” income-transfer objective. The analysis offers an explanation for agricultural policy mechanisms that involve overproduction by high-cost producers, relative to a free-market equilibrium. Such a distortion might arise from the existence of nonmarket values for the production of relatively high-cost farmers in the government's objective. Copyright 2000, Oxford University Press.
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|Date of creation:||01 Feb 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in American Journal of Agricultural Economics, February 1999, vol. 82 no. 1, pp. 14-24|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070|
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- Robert G. Chambers, 1992. "On the Design of Agricultural Policy Mechanisms," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(3), pages 646-654.
- Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Jayet, Pierre-Alain & Picard, Pierre, 1995. "An incentive approach to land set-aside programs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1487-1509, October.
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