Is Financial Openness bad for Education? A Political Economy Perspective on Development
This paper presents a simple model of the links between education, democratization and economic development. In a context of imperfect capital markets, we investigate the incentives for a capitalist oligarchy to subsidize the education of poor workers and to initiate a political transition.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
|Publication status:||Published in European Economic Review, vol. 44, no. 4-6, pp. 891-903.|
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