Optimal Design Of A Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information
Green payment programs, where the government pays farmers directly for environmental benefits, are an alternative to the current method of achieving environmental benefits which restricts farming practices in exchange for deficiency payments. This article presents a voluntary green payment program using the principles of mechanism design under asymmetric information. Information asymmetry arises because the government knows only the distribution of farmersÂ’' production situations, rather than farm-specific information. The program is demonstrated with irrigated corn production in the Oklahoma high plains. A green payment program can reduce budget costs and pollution, while increasing the net social value of corn production.
Volume (Year): 20 (1995)
Issue (Month): 02 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://waeaonline.org/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Lewis, Tracy R. & Feenstra, Robert & Ware, Roger, 1989.
"Eliminating price supports : A political economy perspective,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 159-185, November.
- Lewis, T.R. & Ware, R. & Feenstra, R., 1988. "Eliminating Price Supports: A Political Economy Perspective," Papers 319, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
- Weymark, John A, 1987. "Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1165-1185, September.
- Wu, JunJie & Mapp, Harry P. & Bernardo, Daniel J., 1994. "A Dynamic Analysis of the Impact of Water Quality Policies on Irrigation Investment and Crop Choice Decisions," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(02), pages 506-525, December.
- Wu, JunJie & Mapp, Harry P., Jr. & Bernardo, Daniel J., 1994. "A Dynamic Analysis Of The Impact Of Water Quality Policies On Irrigation Investment And Crop Choice Decisions," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 26(02), December.
- Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:30774. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.