Optimal Design Of A Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- JunJie Wu & Bruce A. Babcock, 1995. "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 95-wp131, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 1995. "Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program Under Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 843, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lewis, Tracy R. & Feenstra, Robert & Ware, Roger, 1989.
"Eliminating price supports : A political economy perspective,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 159-185, November.
- Lewis, T.R. & Ware, R. & Feenstra, R., 1988. "Eliminating Price Supports: A Political Economy Perspective," Papers 319, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
- Weymark, John A, 1987. "Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1165-1185, September.
- Wu, JunJie & Mapp, Harry P. & Bernardo, Daniel J., 1994. "A Dynamic Analysis of the Impact of Water Quality Policies on Irrigation Investment and Crop Choice Decisions," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(02), pages 506-525, December.
- Wu, JunJie & Mapp, Harry P., Jr. & Bernardo, Daniel J., 1994. "A Dynamic Analysis Of The Impact Of Water Quality Policies On Irrigation Investment And Crop Choice Decisions," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 26(02), December.
- Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
More about this item
KeywordsEnvironmental Economics and Policy;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:30774. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/waeaaea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.