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Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes

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  • Weymark, John A

Abstract

Comparative static properties of optimal nonlinear income taxes are obtained for a finite population version o f the Mirrlees income-tax model with a weighted utilitarian social we lfare function and quasilinear preferences. The parameters which are varied are the weights in the welfare function, the slope of the prod uction constraint, and a parameter in the utility function. The endog enous variables are the consumers' consumption levels, pretax incomes (labor supplies in efficiency units), utility levels, and marginal t ax rates. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

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  • Weymark, John A, 1987. "Comparative Static Properties of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 1165-1185, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:55:y:1987:i:5:p:1165-85
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