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Shall We Keep Highly Skilled at Home? The Optimal Income Tax Perspective

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  • Alain Trannoy, Laurent Simula and

    (Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies)

Abstract

We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes abroad changes the optimal non-linear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad net of migration costs, utilities and costs both depending on productivity. Three average social criteria are distinguished – national, citizen and resident – according to the agents whose welfare matters. A curse of the middle-skilled occurs in the first-best and it may be optimal to let some highly skilled leave the country under the resident criterion. In the second-best, we provide an extension of Saez’s formula for the optimal marginal tax rates. The middle-skilled can support the highest average tax rates and the marginal tax rates can be negative. Preventing emigration of the highly skilled is not necessarily optimal under the citizen and resident criteria.

Suggested Citation

  • Alain Trannoy, Laurent Simula and, 2009. "Shall We Keep Highly Skilled at Home? The Optimal Income Tax Perspective," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2009:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:uufswp:2009_009
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    Cited by:

    1. Alejandro Esteller & Amedeo Piolatto & Matthew D. Rablen, 2016. "Taxing high-income earners: tax avoidance and mobility," IFS Working Papers W16/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    2. X. Ruiz del Portal, 2017. "Erratum to: Optimal mixed taxation, public goods and the problem of high-skilled emigration," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 122(2), pages 197-197, October.
    3. Etienne Lehmann & Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2014. "Tax me if you can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(4), pages 1995-2030.
    4. Vilen Lipatov & Alfons J. Weichenrieder & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2010. "Optimal Income Taxation with Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 3108, CESifo.
    5. Alan Krause, 2017. "On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 845-856, April.
    6. Patrice Pieretti & Giuseppe Pulina & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2024. "Fiscal competition and two-way migration," BCL working papers 183, Central Bank of Luxembourg.
    7. Simula, Laurent & Trannoy, Alain, 2010. "Optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top-income earners," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 163-173, February.
    8. Joël Hellier, 2021. "Globalization, Income Tax and the Redistribution–Progressivity Tradeoff," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(3), pages 384-410, September.
    9. Dai, Darong, 2025. "Can the middle class benefit from more conservative redistribution?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    10. Joel HELLIER, 2021. "Globalization and Inequality in Advanced Economies: A Provisional Assessment," Working Papers 575, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    11. Janeba, Eckhard & Schulz, Karl, 2023. "Nonlinear taxation and international mobility in general equilibrium," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    12. Andrea ARIU & Pasquamaria SQUICCIARINI, 2013. "The Balance of Brains: Corruption and High Skilled Migration," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2013010, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    13. Bierbrauer, Felix & Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2013. "Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 292-311.
    14. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka & Yotam Shem-Tov, 2015. "International tax competition: zero tax rate at the top re-established," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(5), pages 760-776, October.
    15. Laurent Simula, 2013. "Tax Competition and Migration," 2013 Meeting Papers 1126, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Patrice Pieretti & Giuseppe Pulina & Andreas Sintos & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2024. "Fiscal Competition and Migration Patterns," DEM Discussion Paper Series 24-04, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    17. Vilen Lipatov & Alfons Weichenrieder, 2015. "Welfare and labor supply implications of tax competition for mobile labor," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 457-477, September.
    18. Dai, Darong & Gao, Wenzheng & Tian, Guoqiang, 2020. "Relativity, mobility, and optimal nonlinear income taxation in an open economy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 57-82.
    19. Joël Hellier, 2018. "Globalization, income tax structure and the redistribution–progressivity tradeoff," Working Papers 464, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    20. Darong Dai & Guoqiang Tian, 2023. "Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(1), pages 183-235, January.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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