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Tax Me If You Can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Between Competing Governments

  • Etienne Lehmann


    (TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS, CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - INSEE - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique, ERMES - Equipe de recherche sur les marches, l'emploi et la simulation - CNRS - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche)

  • Laurent Simula

    (University of Upssala - University of Upssala)

  • Alain Trannoy


    (EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)

We investigate how potential tax-driven migrations modify the Mirrlees income tax schedule when two countries play Nash. The social objective is the maximin and preferences are quasilinear in income. Individuals differ both in skills and migration costs, which are continuously distributed. We derive the optimal marginal income tax rates at the equilibrium, extending the Diamond-Saez formula. The theory and numerical simulations on the US case show that the level and the slope of the semi-elasticity of migration on which we lack empirical evidence are crucial to derive the shape of optimal marginal income tax. Our simulations show that potential migrations result in a welfare drop between 0.4% and 5.3% for the worst-off and an average gain between 18.9% and 29.3% for the top 1%.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00870053.

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Date of creation: 24 Sep 2013
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00870053
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