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Labor Migration and the Case for Flat Tax

Author

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  • Blumkin, Tomer
  • Sadka, Efraim
  • Shem-Tov, Yotam

Abstract

In this paper we employ a tax-competition model to demonstrate that in the presence of migration the re-distributive advantage of a non-linear income tax system over a linear (flat) one is significantly mitigated relative to the autarky (no-migration) equilibrium. A coordinated shift to a flat system with its entailed administrative advantages may therefore be warranted.

Suggested Citation

  • Blumkin, Tomer & Sadka, Efraim & Shem-Tov, Yotam, 2011. "Labor Migration and the Case for Flat Tax," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275759, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275759
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275759
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. X. Ruiz del Portal, 2017. "Optimal mixed taxation, public goods and the problem of high-skilled emigration," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 122(2), pages 97-119, October.

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