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Education and Taxation Policies in the Presence of Countervailing Incentives

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  • ALAN KRAUSE

Abstract

I examine income taxation and education policy when the government cannot observe individual productivity, and there exist conflicting incentives for individuals to understate and overstate their productivity. In this setting I identify four possible equilibria, and discuss the corresponding taxation/education policy mix. I show that no general restrictions on optimal taxation and education policy emerge in this environment, but each equilibrium and corresponding policy package can be associated with a country on the basis of its relative income and preference for redistribution.

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  • Alan Krause, 2009. "Education and Taxation Policies in the Presence of Countervailing Incentives," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(302), pages 387-399, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:econom:v:76:y:2009:i:302:p:387-399
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2008.00695.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Blumkin, Tomer & Sadka, Efraim & Shem-Tov, Yotam, 2011. "Labor Migration and the Case for Flat Tax," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275759, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Bierbrauer, Felix & Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2013. "Strategic nonlinear income tax competition with perfect labor mobility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 292-311.
    3. Alan Krause, 2017. "On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 845-856, April.
    4. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2023. "Information acquisition and countervailing incentives," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    5. Massimo Morelli & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 142-175, February.
    6. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka & Yotam Shem-Tov, 2015. "International tax competition: zero tax rate at the top re-established," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(5), pages 760-776, October.
    7. Laurent Simula, 2013. "Tax Competition and Migration," 2013 Meeting Papers 1126, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2017. "Contractual design in agency problems with non-monotonic cost and correlated information," SERIES 02-2017, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Mar 2017.
    9. Simula, Laurent & Trannoy, Alain, 2010. "Optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top-income earners," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 163-173, February.
    10. Tomer Blumkin & Efraim Sadka & Yotam Shem-Tov, 2011. "Labor Migration and the Case for Flat Tax," CESifo Working Paper Series 3471, CESifo.
    11. Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2012. "Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 751-782, October.
    12. Blumkin, Tomer & Sadka, Efraim & Shem-Tov, Yotam, 2012. "Labor Migration and the Case for Flat Tax," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275771, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.

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