Contractual design in agency problems with non-monotonic cost and correlated information
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More about this item
Keywordsnon-monotonic cost; countervailing incentives; correlated information; limited liability; first-best implementation;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-04-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2017-04-02 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2017-04-02 (Microeconomics)
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