Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information: On the Role of Participation Constraints
We study a manufacturer-retailer relationship where, besides the adverse selection and moral hazard components, it is explicitly considered a type-dependent participation constraint capturing the shadow cost of exclusive dealings. The welfare effects of contracts based on both retail price and sales are compared to those of contracts contingent solely upon sales. When the type-dependent outside option severely aspects the agency problem and contracts are set non-cooperatively, retail price restrictions may be detrimental to consumers. At the same time, if contracts are set cooperatively, we show that whenever sales-based contracts are observed they are detrimental to consumers.
|Date of creation:||01 Jul 2005|
|Date of revision:||01 Jan 2007|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Industrial Economics, 2008, Volume LVI, June, No. 2, pages 379-401|
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