Procurement with specialized firms
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- Boone, Jan & Schottmuller, C., 2016. "Procurement with specialized firms," Other publications TiSEM 34da98d5-1061-409f-a4a3-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Boone, J. & Schottmuller, C., 2011. "Procurement with Specialized Firms," Discussion Paper 2011-131, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Boone, Jan & Schottmüller, Christoph, 2011. "Procurement with specialized firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 8704, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-937, October.
- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008.
"Properties of scoring auctions,"
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- Asker, John & Cantillon, Estelle, 2004. "Properties of Scoring Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4734, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "Properties of scoring auctions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/172674, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2006. "Properties of Scoring Auctions," Working Papers 06-22, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Ganuza, Juan-Jose & Pechlivanos, Lambros, 2000. "Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 105-112, April.
- Araujo, Aloisio & Moreira, Humberto, 2010.
"Adverse selection problems without the Spence-Mirrlees condition,"
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daniel Danau & Annalisa Vinella, 2017. "Contractual design in agency problems with non-monotonic cost and correlated information," SERIES 02-2017, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised Mar 2017.
More about this item
- H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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