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Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Provision Rules vs. Provision Level

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  • Thomas Gaube

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Abstract

Due to the use of distortionary taxation, many believe that real-world economies should attain a lower level of public expenditures than in a situation where lump-sum taxes are available. The present paper examines this hypothesis by means of the two-type self-selection model of income taxation. Based on the findings of Boadway and Keen (1993), I provide sufficient conditions for both a lower and a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best. In particular, it is shown that the separability assumption of Christiansen (1981) leads to under-provision of the public good in the income tax optimum. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Gaube, 2005. "Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Provision Rules vs. Provision Level," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(3), pages 319-334, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:12:y:2005:i:3:p:319-334
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-005-0500-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ming Chang, 2000. "Rules and Levels in the Provision of Public Goods: The Role of Complementarities between the public Good and Taxed Commodities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(1), pages 83-91, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wendner, Ronald, 2008. "Consumption Externalities and Pigouvian Ranking -- A Generalized Cobb-Douglas Example," MPRA Paper 8540, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Wendner, Ronald, 2010. "Ramsey, Pigou, and a Consumption Externality," MPRA Paper 21356, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. A. Sanchez & Diego Martinez, 2011. "Optimization in Non-Standard Problems. An Application to the Provision of Public Inputs," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 37(1), pages 13-38, January.
    4. Ronald Wendner, 2014. "Ramsey, Pigou, Heterogeneous Agents, and Nonatmospheric Consumption Externalities," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(3), pages 491-521, June.
    5. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2014. "State-variable public goods and social comparisons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 390-410.
    6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2007:i:9:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Haavio, Markus & Kotakorpi, Kaisa, 2011. "The political economy of sin taxes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 575-594, May.
    8. Wendner, Ronald & Goulder, Lawrence H., 2008. "Status Effects, Public Goods Provision, and the Excess Burden," MPRA Paper 8260, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Diego Martinez Lopez & A. Jesus Sanchez Fuentes, 2006. "On the optimal level of public inputs," Working Papers 06.34, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2008.
    10. Wendner, Ronald & Goulder, Lawrence H., 2008. "Status effects, public goods provision, and excess burden," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1968-1985, October.
    11. Shuichi Tsugawa & Takuya Obara, 2017. "Public good provision financed by nonlinear income tax under reduction of envy," Working Papers e117, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    12. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision with Endogenous Interest Groups," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 311-342, April.
    13. Kaisa Kotakorpi, 2009. "Paternalism and Tax Competition," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 125-149, March.
    14. Jukka Pirttilä & Matti Tuomala, 2007. "Labour income uncertainty, taxation and public good provision," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 567-582, March.

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    Keywords

    income taxation; public goods;

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