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On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration

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  • Alan Krause

    (University of York)

Abstract

The increasing international mobility of high-skill individuals is often seen as posing a threat to domestic social welfare, by limiting the ability of governments to tax these individuals and redistribute to the poor. In this paper, we examine a simple dynamic nonlinear income tax model without commitment. In this setting, it is shown that the threat of emigration by high-skill individuals facilitates redistribution and increases social welfare in the short-run, and has no effect on social welfare over the long-run.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan Krause, 2017. "On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 845-856, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1038-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1038-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Yunmin & Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2020. "The credibility of commitment and optimal nonlinear savings taxation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    2. Shigeo Morita, 2022. "The MCPF under the pandemic," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(5), pages 993-1015, October.
    3. Shigeo Morita & Takuya Obara, 2021. "Public investment criteria under optimal nonlinear income taxation without commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(4), pages 732-745, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Welfare; Participation Constraint; Reservation Utility; Redistributive Taxation; Utilitarian Social Welfare Function;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration

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