IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/yor/yorken/10-23.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation under Loose Commitment

Author

Listed:
  • Jang-Ting Guo
  • Alan Krause

Abstract

This paper examines an infinite-horizon model of dynamic nonlinear income taxation in which there exists a small probability that the government cannot commit to its future tax policy. In this "loose commitment" environment, we find that even a little uncertainty over whether the government can commit yields substantial effects on the optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax system. Under an empirically plausible parameterization, numerical simulations show that high-skill individuals must be subsidized in the short run, despite the government's redistributive objective, unless the probability of commitment is higher than 98%. Loose commitment also reverses the short-run welfare effects of changes in most model parameters. In particular, all individuals are worse-off, rather than better-off, in the short run when the proportion of high-skill individuals in the economy increases. Finally, our main findings remain qualitatively robust to a setting in which loose commitment is modelled as a Markov switching process.

Suggested Citation

  • Jang-Ting Guo & Alan Krause, 2010. "Optimal Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation under Loose Commitment," Discussion Papers 10/23, Department of Economics, University of York.
  • Handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:10/23
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2010/1023.pdf
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2015. "Dynamic income taxation without commitment: Comparing alternative tax systems," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 319-326.
    2. Jangā€Ting Guo & Alan Krause, 2011. "Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Habit Formation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(3), pages 463-480, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jang-Ting Guo & Alan Krause, 2018. "Changing social preferences and optimal redistributive taxation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 73-92.
    2. Yuhn, Ky-hyang & Bennett, Christopher S., 2016. "A Note On The Bush Tax Cuts: Did They Succeed In Stimulating Business Investment?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(06), pages 1623-1639, September.
    3. Alan Krause, 2015. "On Redistributive Taxation under the Threat of High-Skill Emigration," Discussion Papers 15/21, Department of Economics, University of York.
    4. Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2015. "Dynamic income taxation without commitment: Comparing alternative tax systems," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 319-326.
    5. repec:spr:sochwe:v:48:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-017-1038-8 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic Income Taxation; Loose Commitment;

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:yor:yorken:10/23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paul Hodgson). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deyoruk.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.