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The Credibility of Commitment and Optimal Nonlinear Savings Taxation

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  • Jang-Ting Guo

    (Department of Economics, University of California Riverside)

  • Alan Krause

    (University of York, UK)

Abstract

We compare optimal nonlinear savings taxation under different assumptions with regard to the government's ability to commit to its future tax policy. In particular, we incorporate the possibility that individuals may differ in their beliefs regarding the probability of commitment. When these beliefs are homogeneous, we find that optimal marginal savings tax rates always fall between those under the polar cases of full-commitment (zero marginal savings taxation) and no-commitment (progressive marginal savings taxation). However, this result no longer holds when beliefs are postulated to be heterogeneous. The effects of beliefs changing in response to past commitment or no-commitment decisions by the government are also quantitatively explored.

Suggested Citation

  • Jang-Ting Guo & Alan Krause, 2017. "The Credibility of Commitment and Optimal Nonlinear Savings Taxation," Working Papers 201708, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucr:wpaper:201708
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Savings Taxation; Commitment; Multi-Dimensional Screening.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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