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Optimal nonlinear income taxation with learning-by-doing

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  • Krause, Alan

Abstract

This paper examines a two-period model of optimal nonlinear income taxation with learning-by-doing, in which second-period wages are an increasing function of first-period labour supply. We consider the cases when the government can and cannot commit to its second-period tax policy. In both cases, the canonical Mirrlees/Stiglitz results regarding optimal marginal tax rates generally no longer apply. In particular, if the government cannot commit and each consumer's skill-type is revealed, it is optimal to distort the high-skill type's labour supply downwards through a positive marginal tax rate to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint. Our analysis therefore identifies a setting in which a positive marginal tax rate on the highest-skill individual can be justified, despite its depressing effect on both labour supply and wages.

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  • Krause, Alan, 2009. "Optimal nonlinear income taxation with learning-by-doing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(9-10), pages 1098-1110, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:9-10:p:1098-1110
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    Cited by:

    1. Jang-Ting Guo & Alan Krause, 2018. "Changing social preferences and optimal redistributive taxation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 73-92.
    2. Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2015. "Dynamic nonlinear income taxation with quasi-hyperbolic discounting and no commitment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 101-119.
    3. Robin Boadway & Zhen Song & Jean‐François Tremblay, 2017. "Optimal Income Taxation and Job Choice," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 119(4), pages 910-938, October.
    4. Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2015. "Dynamic income taxation without commitment: Comparing alternative tax systems," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 319-326.
    5. Shigeo Morita, 2017. "Optimal income taxation without commitment: policy implications of durable goods," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 37(4), pages 2917-2934.
    6. Alan Krause, 2017. "On redistributive taxation under the threat of high-skill emigration," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(4), pages 845-856, April.
    7. Craig Brett & John A. Weymark, 2019. "Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings without commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 21(1), pages 5-43, February.
    8. William Peterman, 2016. "The effect of endogenous human capital accumulation on optimal taxation," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 21, pages 46-71, July.
    9. Chen, Yunmin & Guo, Jang-Ting & Krause, Alan, 2020. "The credibility of commitment and optimal nonlinear savings taxation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    10. Davide Dragone & Paolo Vanin, 2022. "Substitution Effects in Intertemporal Problems," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 791-809, August.
    11. Shigeo Morita, 2014. "The time consistent public goods provision," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 14-31, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    12. Shigeo Morita, 2014. "Optimal income taxation without commitment: policy implications of durable goods," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 14-32, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    13. Michael Carlos Best & Henrik Jacobsen Jacobsen, 2013. "Optimal Income Taxation with Career Effects of Work Effort," Working Papers 2013-9, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    14. Shigeo Morita, 2022. "The MCPF under the pandemic," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(5), pages 993-1015, October.
    15. Shigeo Morita & Takuya Obara, 2021. "Public investment criteria under optimal nonlinear income taxation without commitment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(4), pages 732-745, August.

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