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Bunching and Rank-Dependent Optimal Income Taxation

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  • Laurent Simula
  • Alain Trannoy

Abstract

We consider optimal non-linear income tax problems when the social welfare function only depends on ranks as in Yaari (1987) and weights agree with the Lorenz quasi-ordering. Gini, S-Gini, and a class putting more emphasis on inequality in the upper part of the distribution belong to this set. Adopting a first-order approach, we establish marginal tax formula assuming a continuous population framework, and derive conditions on the primitives of the model for which the socially optimal allocation is either fully separating or involves some bunching. For all log-concave survival functions, bunching is precluded for the maximin, Gini, and ”illfare-ranked single-series Ginis”. We then turn to a discrete population setting, and provide ”ABC” formulas for optimal marginal tax rates, which are related to those for a continuum of types but remain essentially distinct.

Suggested Citation

  • Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2020. "Bunching and Rank-Dependent Optimal Income Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 8443, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8443
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rank dependence; Gini; optimal income taxation; bunching; log-concavity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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