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Fiscal competition and two-way migration

Author

Listed:
  • Patrice Pieretti
  • Giuseppe Pulina
  • Skerdilajda Zanaj

Abstract

In this paper, we model two-way migration as the outcome of strategic public policies adopted by competing jurisdictions. We assume that two economies, distinguished by different technological levels, host a continuum of mobile individuals with varying skill levels. To maximize their net revenues, governments compete for mobile workers by taxing wages and providing a public good that enhances firm productivity (public input). We show that the most skilled workers migrate to the technologically advanced economy. However, the government in the less technologically developed economy can retain some of its skilled workers and attract workers from abroad by offering lower taxes or more public inputs. As a result, a two-way migration pattern emerges, driven by governments’ strategic policy choices. Finally, the introduction of heterogeneity in population size does not significantly alter the results.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrice Pieretti & Giuseppe Pulina & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2024. "Fiscal competition and two-way migration," BCL working papers 183, Central Bank of Luxembourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:bcl:bclwop:bclwp183
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bilateral migration; tax competition; heterogeneous skills; technological gap; policy competition.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • F60 - International Economics - - Economic Impacts of Globalization - - - General

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