The Balance of Brains: Corruption and High Skilled Migration
In a mobile labor market, a high emigration rate of high skilled workers is not necessarily a problem, if counterbalanced by a high immigration rate. However, some countries experience a net gain of high skilled while others a net loss. Corruption is part of the explanation, acting through two different channels: first, it pushes skilled natives to virtuous countries, where they can find a job based on meritocratic criteria; second, it discourages the entry of foreign talents, which would hardly have access to string-pulling recommendations. This might induce a prolonged loss in human capital and vanish investments in education.
|Date of creation:||15 May 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10473945
Web page: https://uclouvain.be/en/research-institutes/immaq/ires
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Romer, Paul M, 1986.
"Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-1037, October.
- Paul M Romer, 1999. "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2232, David K. Levine.
- Michel Beine & Romain Noël & Lionel Ragot, 2012. "The Determinants of International Mobility of Students," CESifo Working Paper Series 3848, CESifo Group Munich.
- Michel Beine & Romain Noël & Lionel Ragot, 2013. "The Determinants of International Mobility of Students," Working Papers 2013-30, CEPII research center.
- Michel Beine & Romain Noël & Lionel Ragot, 2013. "The determinants of international mobility of students," EconomiX Working Papers 2013-26, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Defense, EconomiX.
- Daniel Chiquiar & Gordon H. Hanson, 2005. "International Migration, Self-Selection, and the Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(2), pages 239-281, April.
- Daniel Chiquiar & Gordon H. Hanson, 2002. "International Migration, Self-Selection, and the Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United States," NBER Working Papers 9242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Frédéric Docquier & B. Lindsay Lowell & Abdeslam Marfouk, 2009. "A Gendered Assessment of Highly Skilled Emigration," Population and Development Review, The Population Council, Inc., vol. 35(2), pages 297-321.
- Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2012. "Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 751-782, October.
- Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2011. "Shall we Keep the Highly Skilled at Home? The Optimal Income Tax Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series 3326, CESifo Group Munich.
- Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1995. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators," MPRA Paper 23118, University Library of Munich, Germany. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)