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Dual Track Liberalization: With and Without Losers

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  • Jiahua Che
  • Giovanni Facchini

Abstract

The success of the Chinese economic reforms has been linked by many observers to the implementation of a dual track liberalization mechanism. This approach, relying upon the continued enforcement of existing contracts and the simultaneous creation of a free market sector, represents a powerful mechanism in economic reform. If not anticipated, it implements an outcome that is both Pareto improving and e?ciency enhancing as compared to the status quo. When the reform is instead anticipated, intertemporal arbitrage arises, potentially undermining these properties. Only when the original policy involves both price setting and quantity restrictions can anticipated dual track liberalization maintain its attractiveness. While these conditions correspond well to the circumstances faced by transition economies, our analysis invites some caution as for the further applicability of the Chinese approach to economic reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiahua Che & Giovanni Facchini, 2004. "Dual Track Liberalization: With and Without Losers," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-669, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    • Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2004-669
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    Cited by:

    1. Jiahua Che & Giovanni Facchini, 2004. "Dual Track Liberalization: With and Without Losers," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-669, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    2. Che, Jiahua & Facchini, Giovanni, 2007. "Dual track reforms: With and without losers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2291-2306, December.
    3. John Bennett & Huw Dixon & Helen X.Y. Hu, 2008. "The Effects of Reforming the Chinese Dual-Track Price System," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 08-14, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dual Track Liberalization; Intertemporal Arbitrage; Pareto Improving Reforms; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P2 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies
    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade

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