Reform from Within
We present a model of endogenous institutional change that rationalizes reforms that have taken place in the context of economic crisis and drastic political change. Most of these reforms have been initiated by powerholders, even though they have ended worse-off relative to the status quo. The first point we make is that reform is the tool used by some powerful groups to limit the power of their political opponents. The second point is common "access" to economy's resources find it individually rational to overappropriate resources. As a result the economy deteriorates. When the economy reaches a crisis conflict among groups erupts. Reform is the result of this conflict.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: CAER Project, Harvard Institute for International Development, 14 Story Street, Cambridge MA 02138O|
Web page: http://www.hiid.harvard.edu/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alberto Alesina & Allan Drazen, 1989.
"Why are Stabilizations Delayed?,"
NBER Working Papers
3053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gilbert, Richard & Harris, Richard G., 1984.
"Competition with Lumpy Investment,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt11v5q20z, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Lawrence J. Lau & Yingyi Qian & Gerald Roland, 1997.
"Reform Without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
137, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Lawrence J. Lau & Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, 2000. "Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 120-143, February.
- Lawrence J. Lau & Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, 1997. "Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition," Working Papers 97048, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Lau, Lawrence J & Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gérard, 1998. "Reform Without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1798, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Lawrence J. Lau & Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, . "Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China's Dual-Track Approach to Transition," Working Papers 99010, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
- Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995.
"Economic Reform and the Progress of Global Integration,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1733, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew Warner, 1995. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 26(1, 25th A), pages 1-118.
- Aaron Tornell, 1995. "Are Economic Crises Necessary for Trade Liberalization and Fiscal Reform? The Mexican Experience," NBER Chapters, in: Reform, Recovery, and Growth: Latin America and the Middle East, pages 53-76 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- M. Dewatripont & G. Roland, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 703-730.
- Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy, 1992. "The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 155-90, April.
- Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
- Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
- Aaron Tornell & Gerardo Esquivel, 1995.
"The Political Economy of Mexico's Entry to NAFTA,"
NBER Working Papers
5322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aaron Tornell & Gerardo Esquivel Hernández, 1997. "The Political Economy of Mexico's Entry into NAFTA," NBER Chapters, in: Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Arrangements, NBER-EASE Volume 6, pages 25-56 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-31, December.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
- Grossman, Herschel I, 1994. "Production, Appropriation, and Land Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 705-12, June.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:harvid:650. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.