Putting in politics: A review of economic models with endogenous determination of policy
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Volume (Year): 25 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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- Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991.
"Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?,"
6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
- M. Dewatripont & G. Roland, 1992. "Economic Reform and Dynamic Political Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 703-730.
- Gelbach, Jonah B. & Pritchett, Lant H., 1995. "Does more for the poor mean less for the poor? The politics of tagging," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1523, The World Bank.
- Rama, Martin & Tabellini, Guido, 1995.
"Endogenous Distortions in Product and Labour Markets,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rama, Martin & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Endogenous distortions in product and labor markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1413, The World Bank.
- Grossman, Herschel I, 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 912-21, September.
- Marcouiller, Douglas & Young, Leslie, 1995. "The Black Hole of Graft: The Predatory State and the Informal Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 630-46, June.
- Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
- Cesar Martinelli & Mariano Tommasi, 1993. "Sequencing of Economic Reforms in the Presence of Political Constraints," UCLA Economics Working Papers 701, UCLA Department of Economics.
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