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Can democracy induce development? A constitutional perspective

  • Hans Gersbach

    ()

  • Lars-H. Siemers

    ()

We examine the constitutional design required for democratic societies to overcome poverty traps. Restricting agenda setting by ensuring subsistence levels of consumption and applying simple majority voting as a decision rule will not enable a society to overcome poverty. We show that a combination of suitable constitutional rules can, however, overcome poverty and induce economic well-being. Besides majority voting, these rules include rotating agenda setting, agenda repetition, and tax-protection rules. We thus highlight the crucial role of democratic institutions for economic development. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-012-0036-8
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 159 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 177-196

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:159:y:2014:i:1:p:177-196
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-0036-8
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Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2

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