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Elecotral Systems and Corruption


  • Verardi, Vincenzo



Recently, many scholars have tried to explain how electoral systems are linked to corruption. Several theories emerged but still no consensus has been reached. With a dataset of about 50 democratic countries considered over 10 years we try to understand which of the effects highlighted in the theoretical literature dominates. The results tend to show that larger voting districts (characterized by lower barriers to entry) are associated with less corruption, whereas closed lists tend to be associated with more The latter effect is nevertheless not robust. In aggregate, we find that majoritarian systems tend to be associated to higher levels of corruption than proportional representations. An additional finding is that presidential regimes tend to be associated with more corruption than parliamentary ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Verardi, Vincenzo, 2004. "Elecotral Systems and Corruption," Revista Latinoamericana de Desarrollo Economico, Instituto de Investigaciones Socio-Económicas (IISEC), Universidad Católica Boliviana, issue 3, pages 117-150, Octubre.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:revlde:0304

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
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    8. Myerson, Roger B., 1999. "Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 671-697, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joanna Dzionek-Kozlowska, 2014. "Political Corruption and Electoral Systems Seen with Economists’ Lenses," Annales. Ethics in Economic Life, University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, vol. 17(4), pages 79-92, December.

    More about this item


    Electoral; Systems; Corruption;

    JEL classification:

    • Z00 - Other Special Topics - - General - - - General


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