Political Institutions and Trade Protection
Why do levels of trade protection differ so much across countries? Weargue that differences in electoral rules and executive powers mayplay a significant role. We develop a theoretical model and show thatcountries that have a majoritarian electoral system may be moreinclined to have a high level of trade protection. The reason is thatthese countries have fiercer competition for swing districts if comparedto countries that have a proportional electoral system. In the empiricalpart of the paper we show that countries that have a majoritarianelectoral system indeed have higher levels of protection. This result isrobust to various measures of trade protection and to an instrumentalvariables approach that takes account of the endogeneity of politicalinstitutions. We find only weak support for the claim thatpresidentialism reduces trade protection.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 80125, NL-3508 TC Utrecht|
Phone: +31 30 253 9800
Fax: +31 30 253 7373
Web page: http://www.uu.nl/EN/faculties/leg/organisation/schools/schoolofeconomicsuse/Pages/default.aspx
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
- Rodrik, Dani, 1996.
"Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1388, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October.
- Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," NBER Working Papers 5537, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Marius Brülhart, 1998. "Trading Places: Industrial Specialization in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 319-346, 09.
- Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Roberto Perotti & Massimo Rostagno, 2002. "Electoral Systems and Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 609-657.
- Marius Brülhart, 2001. "Evolving geographical concentration of European manufacturing industries," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 137(2), pages 215-243, June.
- Dutt, Pushan & Mitra, Devashish, 2002. "Endogenous trade policy through majority voting: an empirical investigation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 107-133, October.
- V. V. Chari & Larry E. Jones & Ramon Marimon, 1997.
"The economics of split-ticket voting in representative democracies,"
582, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Chari, V V & Jones, Larry E & Marimon, Ramon, 1997. "The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 957-976, December.
- Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2002.
"Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation,"
NBER Working Papers
9239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pushan Dutt & Devashish Mitra, 2005. "Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(1), pages 59-72, February.
- Traistaru, Iulia & Volpe Martincus, Christian, 2003.
"Economic integration and manufacturing concentration patterns: Evidence from Mercosur,"
ZEI Working Papers
B 23-2003, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
- Christian Volpe Martincus & Iulia Traistaru, 2004. "Economic Integration And Manufacturing Concentration Patterns: Evidence From Mercosur," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 163, Royal Economic Society.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1998.
"The size and scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians,"
658, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 699-735, April.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics With Rational Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 2051, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1998. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians," NBER Working Papers 6848, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1998. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians," Papers 658, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
- Romain Wacziarg & Karen Horn Welch, 2008.
"Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence,"
World Bank Economic Review,
World Bank Group, vol. 22(2), pages 187-231, June.
- Wacziarg, Romain & Welch, Karen Horn, 2003. "Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence," Research Papers 1826, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Romain Wacziarg & Karen Horn Welch, 2003. "Trade Liberalization and Growth: New Evidence," NBER Working Papers 10152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Torsten Persson & Gérard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 1997.
"Separation of Powers and Political Accountability,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202.
- Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "The Economic Effects of Constitutions," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661926, December.
- André Sapir & Richard Baldwin & Daniel Cohen & Anthony Venables, 1999. "Market integration, regionalism and the global economy," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8074, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0406. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marina Muilwijk)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.