Why risk popular ratification failure? A comparative analysis of the choice of the ratification instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU
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Volume (Year): 20 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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- CLAES H. dE VREESE & HAJO G. BOOMGAARDEN, 2006. "Media Effects on Public Opinion about the Enlargement of the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 419-436, 06.
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