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Trade Negaciations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups

Author

Listed:
  • Rosendorff, B.P.
  • Milner, H.

Abstract

A domestic ratification game nested within an international bargaining game establishes that domestic politics influences the outcome of international negotiations. When information on the domestic side is incomplete, an informational role of lobbies is established. Cooperation is more likely when domestic lobbies provide information to Congress about a treaty presented for ratification, especially when cooperation would not otherwise occur. As government becomes more divided, cooperation is less likely; when it does occur, the legislature is better off – internal divisions worsen the external leverage of states, while a united home front is the executive's best chance for obtaining her ideal agreement.
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Suggested Citation

  • Rosendorff, B.P. & Milner, H., 1995. "Trade Negaciations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups," Papers 9510, Southern California - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:socaec:9510
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Hug & Tobias Schulz, 2005. "Using Mass Survey Data to Infer Political Positions," European Union Politics, , vol. 6(3), pages 339-352, September.
    2. Simon Hug & Tobias Schulz, 2007. "Referendums in the EU’s constitution building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 177-218, June.
    3. Xinyuan Dai, 2006. "Dyadic Myth and Monadic Advantage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(3), pages 267-297, July.
    4. Thomas Konig & Jonathan Slapin, 2004. "Bringing Parliaments Back in," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 357-394, July.
    5. Brender, Agnes, 2018. "Determinants of International Arms Control Ratification," ILE Working Paper Series 17, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    6. J. Broz, 2011. "The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 341-368, September.
    7. Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler, 2011. "The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 325-354, December.
    8. Victoria Pistikou, 2020. "The Impact of CEFTA on Exports, Economic Growth and Development," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), Democritus University of Thrace (DUTH), Kavala Campus, Greece, vol. 13(3), pages 15-31, December.
    9. Leslie Johns, 2014. "Depth versus rigidity in the design of international trade agreements," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(3), pages 468-495, July.
    10. Jean-Pierre P. Langlois & Catherine C. Langlois, 2004. "Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 261-293, April.
    11. Levy, Philip I., 1999. "Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 345-370, April.
    12. Simon Hug & Thomas König, 2007. "Domestic structures and constitution-building in an international organization: Introduction," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 105-113, June.
    13. Maggi, Giovanni, 2014. "International Trade Agreements," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 317-390, Elsevier.
    14. Thomas König & Daniel Finke, 2007. "Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 153-176, June.
    15. Eckhardt, Jappe & Serrano, Omar, 2014. "Economic Integration and Rivalry in Asia: Comparing Regional Trade Strategies of China and India," Papers 762, World Trade Institute.
    16. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey S., 2002. "Costly signaling and cheap talk in models of political influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 263-280, June.
    17. Jonathan B. Slapin, 2006. "Who Is Powerful?," European Union Politics, , vol. 7(1), pages 51-76, March.
    18. Robert Pahre, 1997. "Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 147-174, February.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F19 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Other

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