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Political Groups, Leader Change, and the Pattern of International Cooperation

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  • Alastair Smith

    (Wilf Family Department of Politics New York University, New York)

Abstract

Nations are politically heterogeneous and which group is in political ascendency shapes the nature of interstate cooperation through two mechanisms. First, groups differ in the benefits they receive from cooperation. This affects which groups can commit to cooperate. Second, a nation may selectively withhold cooperation from one group to influence the domestic political competition between groups in another nation. By integrating political competition between leaders of different groups under different institutional rules into a prisoner’s dilemma model of international cooperation, the theory generates hypotheses relating leader turnover, group membership, and patterns of cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Alastair Smith, 2009. "Political Groups, Leader Change, and the Pattern of International Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(6), pages 853-877, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:53:y:2009:i:6:p:853-877
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002709344419
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pei Sun & Kamel Mellahi & Mike Wright & Haoping Xu, 2015. "Political Tie Heterogeneity and the Impact of Adverse Shocks on Firm Value," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(8), pages 1036-1063, December.

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