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Deterring or Mobilizing? The Influence of Government Partisanship and Force on the Frequency, Lethality and Suicide Attacks of Terror Events

  • Koch Michael


    (Texas A&M Political Science Department)

  • Tkach Benjamin


    (Texas A&M Political Science Department)

Registered author(s):

    The ability of a government to prevent violence and threats against the state and its citizens depends on the government’s ability to deter enemies from engaging in such tactics. Because deterrence relies on both capabilities and credibility it is not clear that governments that emerge within the same state are similarly effective at deterring attacks. We examine whether partisan politics and the decision to use force against an enemy or those thought to be associated with an enemy—in our case terrorists—affects successful deterrence. We test our expectations using data from the Israeli-Palestine conflict between the years 1979 and 2003. The results suggest that governments of the right are more effective at using force to deter future terrorist attacks.

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    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 1-29

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    Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:18:y:2012:i:2:n:5
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    1. David A. Jaeger & Esteban Klor & Sami Miaari & Daniele Paserman, 2008. "The Struggle for Palestinian Hearts and Minds: Violence and Public Opinion in the Second Intifada," HiCN Working Papers 52, Households in Conflict Network.
    2. Eric D. Gould & Esteban F. Klor, 2010. "Does Terrorism Work?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(4), pages 1459-1510.
    3. David A. Jaeger & M. Daniele Paserman, 2008. "The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1591-1604, September.
    4. Efraim Benmelech & Claude Berrebi & Esteban Klor, 2010. "Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions," NBER Working Papers 16493, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jaeger, David A & Paserman, M. Daniele, 2006. "Israel, the Palestinian Factions and the Cycle of Violence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Jaeger, David A. & Paserman, M. Daniele, 2009. "The Shape of Things to Come? On the Dynamics of Suicide Attacks and Targeted Killings," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 4(4), pages 315-342, December.
    7. Asaf Zussman & Noam Zussman, 2006. "Assassinations: Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Israeli Counterterrorism Policy Using Stock Market Data," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 193-206, Spring.
    8. Schultz, Kenneth A., 2005. "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(01), pages 1-38, January.
    9. Schultz, Kenneth A., 1999. "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(02), pages 233-266, March.
    10. Daniel G. Arce M. & Todd Sandler, 2003. "An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 132-, March.
    11. Claude Berrebi & Esteban F. Klor, 2008. "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism?: Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate," Working Papers 477-1, RAND Corporation Publications Department.
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